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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2)(j). This case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The standard of review for Rule 11, and the statement of issues on cross 
appeal are set forth at page 42 below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action is the third in a series of actions initiated by the Gillmors seeking to 
obtain expanded use of two mountain trails that traverse property initially owned by 
David Richards. ( R. 1). The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claims based upon 
defendants' motion to dismiss. ( R. 154). The trial court also awarded sanctions against 
Gillmor's counsel. ( R. 195). Both parties have appealed the trial court's rulings 
The following facts provide a statement of the case: 
1. All of the property that is at issue, apart from the Gillmor property, was 
initially owned by David K. Richards or David K. Richards & Company ("Richards"). 
(See 2nd Am. Comply Case No. 010600155 (the "2001 Action"), ffi[l-3; Ex. 1 to Def. 
Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss, R. 31). 
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2. The property now owned by Nadine Gillmor ("Gillmor"), the plaintiff, was 
previously owned by her now deceased husband, Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. (2nd Am. 
Compl.,ffl[2-3;R.31,Ex. 1.) 
3. An action was commenced in 1984 in the Third District Court in Summit 
County by Gillmor's late husband, Charles F. Gillmor, against Richards seeking an 
injunction against Richards' alleged interference with Charles Gillmor's use of the Perdue 
Creek and Neil Creek roads. (2nd Am. Compl., ^ 3, Ex. 1 and Complaint in Civil No. 
8065 (the "1984 Action") Ex.2, both attached to R. 31. 
4. The 1984 Action was settled in November, 1985, by way of an Easement 
and Use Agreement (the "1985 Agreement") which granted Charles F. Gillmor easements 
for limited purposes across the Perdue Creek road and portions of the Neil Creek road. 
(See Ex. A attached to Order, Ex. 3, to Def. Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J., R. 31.) The 
Agreement, dated November 21, 1985, provided in f^ 8 that it was "binding upon and shall 
inure to the benefit of the parties hereto [Frank Gillmor and David K. Richards & 
Company], their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs, personal 
representatives, successors, assigns, owners, occupants and lessees..." (Id.) 
5. The 1985 Agreement further provides that: 
Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not use the 
Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his invitees, agents, 
or employees in such a manner so as to cause the Easements to 
become part of the public domain. Gillmor specifically covenants 
and agrees that he shall not allow the Gillmor property to be used in 
such a manner so as to subject the Easements to demands by the 
public for access to any portion of the Gillmor property. 
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(Paragraph 2, pp. 2 and 3 of Ex. A attached to the Order, which is Ex. 3 to R.31.) 
6. The Order dismissing the 1984 Action dismissed ".. .all plaintiffs claims... 
with prejudice and on the merits. . ." (Ex. 3 to R.31.) 
7. In 2001, Nadine Gillmor filed suit against Robin Macey, Ken Macey, 
Family Link, and ultimately, David K. Richards seeking, among other things, injunctive 
relief prohibiting the defendants from interfering with her and her family's use of the 
Perdue Creek and Neil Creek roads, and for a declaration of her rights under the 1985 
Agreement. (Ex. 1 to R.31.) 
8. The 2001 Action was tried to the district court over six days in March 2002. 
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Hilder penned his own Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (Ex. 4 to R. 31) 
9. Among other things, Judge Hilder found (R.31, Ex. 4) the following facts: 
13. . . . The evidence, however, made it clear that while historic 
use has significant weight, the [1985 Agreement] was a compromise 
on both sides, with an inevitable and knowing departure from at least 
some historic uses. 
15. . . . As part of [Richards'] desire to minimize traffic and 
damage, Richards intended by the agreement to insure that Gillmor 
not be permitted to develop his property in any way by use of the 
Richards' property that could support a claim that the access routes 
had become public roads. 
16. For his part, Gillmor wanted to preserve his immediate 
family's general access, preserve a right he claimed historically to 
trail livestock, and preserve or secure a right of access for the 
Howard group in order that he could continue his agreement with 
them to trade maintenance for hunting and recreation rights. To 
accomplish his overall purpose, Gillmor clearly intended to give up 
his claimed to historical right to use the Neil Creek access (except 
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for emergency egress), and to generally use only the less desirable 
Perdue Creek road, subject to his right to maintain, and to improve as 
necessary, the Perdue Creek access. 
18. Richards' intention that Gillmor could use his property as he 
wished included Gillmor's right to construct additional structures, 
but Richards absolutely did not intend that Gillmor could use the 
servient property [the Neil Creek or Perdue Creek roads] to aid such 
construction in any way. The parties did not intend, and the 
agreement does not provide, for Gillmor to use the servient property 
for construction access in any form, such as transportation of 
building materials or construction workers. The parties did negotiate 
to allow access for animal husbandry, but that provision was never 
intended to be construed so broadly as to allow access to construct 
residential dwellings. 
10. On or about September 24, 2002, Judge Hilder entered a judgment (Ex. 5 to 
R. 31) in the 2001 Action which provides (in Section 3 at p. 4), among other things, as 
follows: 
This [1985 easement] may not be used to engage in new construction 
on the Gillmor property, in the guise of maintenance. Access for any 
work on the Gillmor property that does not fit clearly within the 
definition of access route maintenance must qualify as "animal 
husbandry." 
11. Gillmor appealed Judge Hilder's judgment. Richards and Maceys cross-
appealed. On August 25, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Gillmor v. 
Macey, 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57. 
12. Among other things, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding 
that Gillmor could not use either the Perdue Creek or the Neil Creek road for purposes of 
cabin construction. (2005 UT App. 351, ^ 28-29) The Court of Appeals made two 
additional observations as follows: 
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However, given our conclusion, the grant of access is narrow as to 
those it benefits. . . . flf 23) 
As a result, the purposes for which invitees may use the easements 
are limited to those expressly addressed in the agreement. fl[ 25) 
13. Neither the 1984 Complaint (R. 31, Ex. 2) nor the 2001 Second Amended 
Complaint (R. 31, Ex. 1) assert any claim for relief based upon the theories presented in 
the present litigation, i.e., that the Neil Creek or Perdue Creek roads had acquired status 
as public thoroughfares, or that Gillmor was entitled to private condemnation of the 
roadways pursuant to UCA § 78-34-1 (now § 78B-6-501). 
14. Gillmor filed this action in July, 2007. (Compl., R. 1.) 
15. Defendants Ken Macey, Robin Macey and David Richards served Gillmor's 
counsel with a Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Memorandum in Support of the Motion on August 6, 2007. (R. I l l ) 
16. Defendants' filed their Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment on August 31, 2007. (R. 21) Gillmor cross-moved for partial 
summary judgment on her condemnation claim on October 10, 2007. (R. 70) 
17. The Court heard argument on the cross-motions on December 19, 2007. (R. 
110.) In the course of the hearing, counsel for Gillmor acknowledged that he had 
informed Gillmor that the Defendants had "a pretty good argument in this case [on claim 
preclusion.]" {Id. at 31). Counsel also acknowledged that Gillmor could have brought 
the two claims asserted in this action in the 2001 Action but said that doing so would 
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have been "dicey" because Gillmor was claiming in that action to have extensive private 
rights under the Easement Agreement. {Id. at 40.) 
18. Counsel for Gillmor repeatedly urged the Court not to grant defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss on res judicata grounds because he would simply find another 
plaintiff, not involved in the earlier cases, to bring the road-by-use-claim. Counsel stated, 
"And frankly if the Court dismisses this, I'll bring it in somebody else's name as well." 
(R. 110 at 27). Counsel also argued that dismissing Gillmor's suit would not serve the 
purpose of conserving judicial resources intended by res judicata because he would find 
another plaintiff to bring the road-by-use claim, going so far as to say, "I'll find 
somebody off the street" if necessary. {Id. at 33). 
19. Judge Hilder, the same judge that tried the 2001 Action, dismissed the 2007 
Action, stating that '\r]es judicata bars all claims that were or could have been brought in 
prior litigation between the same parties or their privies concerning the same operative 
facts or controversy. Plaintiffs claims in this case could have been brought in Gillmor v. 
Macey et al., Civil No. 010600155, Third District Court 2001, or in Gillmor v. Richards, 
Civil No. 8065, Third District Court, 1984." (R. 154 at 155) After the Court had 
announced its ruling, Gillmor's counsel stated, "It's going to go up on appeal and we'll 
find another plaintiff and we'll do it again." (R. 110 at p. 62,1. 6-8.) 
20. There is no allegation in the 2007 Complaint that Gillmor's property is 
landlocked. The allegation in paragraph 9 of the Complaint is that the property is 
"essentially landlocked". (Compl., R. 1.) In the 2001 Action, the Court found that other 
6 
means of access have been used to get to the Gillmor property. (R. 31, Ex. 4, ^ 21). 
Gillmor concedes for the first time in her brief before this Court, that the Perdue Creek 
and Neil Creek roads are merely the "most convenient" for her use. (Appellant Br. at 3). 
21. No allegation was made in the 2007 Complaint that the 1984 or the 2001 
Actions had been brought against less than all of the owners of the property between the 
Weber Canyon Highway and Gillmor's property, and over which the Perdue Creek and 
Neil Creek roads pass on their way to the Gillmor property. (Compl., R. 1.) In fact, 
Gillmor conceded as much in her pleadings opposing the motion to dismiss. (Compare 
Statement of Fact ^ 2, R. 36, with PI. Mem. Opp'n Mot. Dismiss, at 2, R. 71. ("The 
statement of undisputed facts... is adopted by Plaintiff in totoP) 
22. Defending the previous case brought by Gillmor in 2001, through discovery 
and six days of trial, post trial motions, on appeal before the Court of Appeals and on the 
Motion for Writ of Certiorari before the Utah Supreme Court cost David Richards and the 
Maceys over $100,000.00 each. (R. 229, p. 10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed because the Brief of Appellant 
fails to comply with Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Gillmor's 
failure to make a concise statement of the facts cited to the pages of the record where 
those facts are supported, permits this Court to assume the correctness of the judgment 
below. 
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The judgment should be affirmed for the further reason that this action is barred by 
res judicata or claim preclusion. This action involves the same parties or their assigns as 
the two earlier actions, makes claims that could have been asserted in the earlier actions 
and both of those actions resulted in judgments on the merits. 
Gillmor now asserts that her claims in this action are not barred because they 
should have been analyzed under the doctrine of issue preclusion and because there was a 
change in the law after the 2001 action. However, she did not raise issue preclusion 
arguments in the trial court, and for that reason they should not be considered. 
Additionally, there has been no change in the law precluding application ofres judicata. 
The judgment should be affirmed on the alternative grounds of judicial estoppel. 
Gillmor's position in this action that the Perdue and Neil Creek roads are public is 
contrary to the positions taken by Gillmor in the earlier suits that the roads are private. 
On the basis of that earlier position Gillmor and her predecessor obtained significant 
access over the roads which would otherwise not have been obtained. Gillmor is 
therefore estopped from now claiming that the roads are public. 
Finally, the trial court properly awarded sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2) against 
Gillmor's counsel because the claims in this action were clearly barred by res judicata. 
Counsel for Gillmor failed to provide the trial court with any cogent authority supporting 
Gillmor's contention that res judicata should not bar this action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF FAILS TO COMPLY WITH UTAH R. APP. P. 24. 
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Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the brief of 
the appellant must contain: 
A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings 
below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. (Emphasis added.) 
Failure to cite to the record as required significantly impedes the Court's ability to 
dispose of the case before it and is sanctionable. Koulis v. Std. Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 
1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).1 If a party fails to make a concise statement of the facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported, the court will assume 
the correctness of the judgment below. Id. see also Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("[Appellant's] brief failed to conform to the requirements of Rule 
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, we decline to address 
[Appellant's] argument on appeal and affirm the trial court's order...."). 
Appellant Gillmor's brief contains not a single citation to the record in the 
Statement of the Case, the Statement of Relevant Facts or the Argument. Not 
surprisingly, many of the briefs statements concerning the facts and the course of 
proceedings are factually incorrect or completely without support in the record. For 
instance, Gillmor states that this action is the first action brought "against all the 
landowners who block her property from declared public roads, not just Mr. Richards and 
l Koulis was decided under the Rules of the Supreme Court, the requirements of which 
were carried into Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). 
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his successors-in interest." (Appellant Br. at 4). The record below demonstrates that: (i) 
Gillmor admitted that Richards was the defendant in the 1984 action brought by 
Gillmor's predecessor in interest, Charles Frank Gillmor, and originally owned all of the 
property between the Weber Canyon Road and the Gillmor property traversed by the 
Perdue Creek and Neil Creek roads, and (ii) that all defendants in the 2001 Action and 
this action claim through Richards. (R. 36, Statement of Facts, ^ 2; and R. 71, p. 1.) 
Similarly, Gillmor claims in her brief that defendants gave the notice required by Utah R. 
Civ. P. 11 that sanctions would be sought on the basis of their arguments concerning both 
res judicata and judicial estoppel. (Appellant Br. at 4-5 n.l). The record demonstrates 
that the defendants sought Rule 11 sanctions only on the basis of their res judicata 
argument. (R. 114 at 120) 
Gillmor's failure to cite to the record as required by Rule 24 has resulted in a 
distortion of the presentation of the proceedings below and the facts relevant to this case. 
The Court should therefore assume the correctness of the trial court decision and affirm 
that decision. 
II. GILLMOR'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY RES JUDCA TA 
The trial court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis ofres judicata. 
(See Order, at f 1, R. 155). Specifically, the trial court ruled that "res judicata bars all 
claims that were or could have been brought in prior litigation between the same parties 
or their privies concerning the same operative facts or controversy. Plaintiffs claims in 
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this case could have been brought in [two prior cases]." Id. Gillmor fails to show that 
this determination constitutes reversible error. 
Res judicata refers to the doctrine that gives judgments preclusive effect in 
subsequent litigation. Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 
T| 25, 110 P.3d 678. It prevents a litigant from pursuing a claim through "piecemeal 
litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve for future 
litigation should the first prove unsuccessful." Am. Estates Mgmt. v. InVl Inv. & Dev. 
Corp., 1999 UT App 232, f 14, 986 P.2d 765 (citation omitted); see also In re J J J., 877 
P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he proper administration of justice is best served 
by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause."). Moreover, it serves the "vital 
public interests" of "(1) fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing 
inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits; 
and (4) conserving judicial resources." Office of Recovery Servs. v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 
946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The policy promoting finality in judgments is particularly relevant in cases 
involving title to real property: "When . . . title to real property is at issue, the need for 
finality is at its apex." Am. Estates Mgmt., 1999 UT App 232, \ 10 (holding that claim 
preclusion barred adverse possession claim in second action seeking to quiet title to 
parking space since that claim should have been brought in prior action that alleged 
breach of contract for failing to convey the same property); see also Wheadon v. Pearson, 
376 P.2d 946, 948 (Utah 1962) {res judicata barred defendants from trying to establish a 
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right of way by implied easement when their prior case seeking to obtain the same relief 
by way of prescriptive easement had been dismissed; plaintiff "should be denied a second 
attempt at substantially the same objective under a different guise"). 
This Court should affirm the trial court's determination because each of the 
elements required to establish claim preclusion are present here, and Gillmor does not 
quality for any exceptions. To the extent Gillmor now argues that the trial court should 
have applied issue preclusion - rather than claim preclusion or a change-in-the-law 
exception - these arguments were not preserved for appeal. 
A. Gillmor did not preserve her issue preclusion arguments below. 
Gillmor's opening brief seems to advance a theory based on issue preclusion. (See 
Appellant Br. at § I). Gillmor also argues that res judicata is not applicable to this case 
because there has been an intervening change in the law. Neither of these theories were 
argued below. For instance, in her memorandum opposing dismissal, Gillmor argued 
only that claim preclusion did not apply because "...there are narrow exceptions to the 
claim preclusion rule. It is on those exceptional principles that Plaintiff brings her 
complaint to the Court/' (R. 71.) The only "exceptions" argued by Gillmor, however, 
were (a) amorphous "public policy" or equitable exceptions to claim preclusion and (b) a 
so-called "change in the operative facts" exception to claim preclusion. Id. at 12-1 A. 
There is no mention of either issue preclusion or the "change in the law" exception to res 
judicata. Accordingly, Gillmor's new theories should not be addressed by this Court. 
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"Issues not raised at trial are usually deemed waived and cannot be argued for the 
first time on appeal." Doug Jessop Const., Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT App 348, % 18, 195 
P.3d 493 (citation omitted). "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court 
may not be raised on appeal ... unless a [litigant] can demonstrate that exceptional 
circumstances exist or plain error occurred. Provo City v. Ivie, 2008 UT App 287, |^ 5, 
191 P.3d 841 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Marchandv. Marchand, 
2006 UT App 429, f 8, 147 P.3d 538 (same). 
An issue is not preserved unless it is "presented to the trial court in such a way that 
the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." hunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, 
Tf 23, 186 P.3d 978 (citation omitted). "This puts the trial court on notice of any asserted 
error and allows the court to correct such error in the course of the proceeding." Doug 
Jessop Const., Inc., 2008 UT App 348, \ 18. For a trial court to rule effectively on an 
issue, three requirements must be met: 
(1) 'the issue must be raised in a timely fashion'; (2) 'the issue must 
be specifically raised5; and (3) a party must introduce 'supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority.' Id. (quoting Hart v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). 
Id. None of these requirements have been met by Gillmor. 
In addition, Gillmor has failed to show that an exception to this general rule 
applies. "This preservation rule has been extended to apply to every claim unless a 
[party] can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or plain error occurred." 
hunt, 2008 UT App 192, f 23 (quotations and citations omitted). The exceptional 
circumstances doctrine is "used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional 
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situations, for cases ... involving rare procedural anomalies...and [may be employed] 
where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law color[s] the failure to have 
raised an issue at trial/' Provo City, 2008 UT App 287, \ 6 (quotations and citations 
omitted), while, "to prevail under a plain error analysis, an error must have occurred, that 
error should have been apparent to the trial court, and the error must be harmful," Classic 
Cabinets, Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App 88, U 17, 978 P.2d 465 
(citation omitted). Gillmor does not argue that either exception applies here; indeed, 
Gillmor does not even mention these exceptions. 
Further, as part of the preservation rule, an appellant is required to "ccit[e] to the 
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court.'" hunt, 2008 UT App 192, 
% 23 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)), or to provide a "statement of grounds for 
review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B). Gillmor 
has failed to meet either requirement. 
The purpose for the general rule is plain: "The trial court is considered the proper 
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of issues.... Failing to 
argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that forum denies the trial court the 
opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law pertinent to the claimed 
error." Marchand, 2006 UT App 429, % 8 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Gillmor has apparently abandoned the "exceptional principles" theory, and now 
wants to argue that issue preclusion, rather than claim preclusion, applies to her claims. 
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Because Gillmor failed to present this argument to the trial court, this Court should refuse 
to address the same. 
B. Gillmor's claims are barred by claim preclusion. 
Res judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Brigham 
Young Univ., 2005 UT 19, f^ 25. "Claim preclusion involves the same parties or their 
privies and also the same cause of action, 'and this precludes the relitigation of all issues 
that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior 
action.'" Maoris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, \ 19, 16 P.3d 1214 (citation 
omitted, emphasis added). 
For claim preclusion to apply, three elements must be satisfied: "(I) [T]he 
subsequent action must involve the same parties, their privies, or their assigns as the first 
action, (2) the claim to be barred must have been brought or have been available in the 
first action, and (3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the merits of 
the claim." Brigham Young Univ., 2005 UT 19, U 26. 
1. This action involved the same parties or their assigns. 
There was no dispute in this matter regarding the first element of claim preclusion, 
i.e., that the actions involve the "same parties or their assigns". In the 2001 Action and 
in this action, Nadine Gillmor is the plaintiff. In both cases, Family Link, Ken and Robin 
Macey, and David Richards (either personally or in his corporate capacity) are 
defendants. The 1984 Action involved Gillmor's predecessor and Richards. (R. 31, Ex. 
2) To the extent the 2007 Complaint names more or different defendants than the 2001 
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Complaint, it adds them as parties claiming an interest flowing from Richards. The 
defendants in this case all claim through Richards. (R. 36, para. 2) In other words, 
regardless of the identity of named parties, both the 2001 and 2007 complaints (as well as 
the 1984 Action) name the same parties in interest, namely: (1) the owner of the dominant 
estate claiming an interest or use in the rights of way at issue; and (2) all of the owners of 
the servient estates over which the claimed right of ways run or which are burdened by 
the claimed use. Ultimately, these circumstances were not disputed by Gillmor before the 
trial court. There are not, as Gillmor suggests for the first time in her brief (Appellant Br. 
at 4), other landowners who own property over which these trails pass between her 
property and the Weber Canyon highway. (See Statement of Facts, supra, ^ 21.) 
2. This action involves claims that could have been asserted in prior actions. 
With respect to the second element of claim preclusion, separate claims are subject 
to claim preclusion where they arise from the same state of facts and the same kind of 
evidence is necessary to sustain either cause of action. Macris, 2000 UT 93, \ 28. 
"[W]here the different causes of action are based on the same set of operative facts, it is 
clear that principles of preclusion demand that the claims be litigated in a single setting." 
Nipper v. Douglas, 2004 UT App 118 n.2, 90 P.3d 649. See also Lane v. Honeywell, Inc., 
663 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D. Utah 1987) (a plaintiff must assert "all theories for relief 
against a defendant with respect to all or any part of a transaction, or series of transactions 
out of which the action arose"); Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 2004 UT App 33, ^ f 3, 86 P.3d 
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the same set of operative facts alleged in that suit"). 
It i order to determine whether a subsequent clain i should have been brought 
, . .'.i- aLih;];.. . .^ . ..:. "aggregate oi operative facts tl le situatioi i or state 
o f f , ' ' W. 
232. Therefore, what is relevant to a claim preclusion inquiry is whether there is an 
identity of facts and evidence between the two cases, not whether a different legal theory 
1 ias be et i asserted in tl i " secoi id case St •< > h ft n y / s, 2000 \ ) 1 93 *| 28 " 'Rati iei 1.1 lai I 
resting on the specific let?al 'h-.v»n invoked, res judicata generally is thought to turn on 
the essential simi!.irit\ oi the muierhing events giving rise 1 > (he \arious legal c l a i m s / " 
. . ... icitation omitted). 
i t iuiiov\ " lifiVn v •' • 
where there has been no change in the operative facts. See Collins v. Sandy City Bu. of 
Adjustment, .'0- \ j r ( - • MI * Mirthermore, "[tjhr la-* in *u~h 
generally prol libits splittii ig ca/i lses of acti :)f] " Dt *n, tl s v I \ isquez, 2003 I J I /:'" kpp 168, '"'I 6, 
72 P.3d 135. Regardless of the theory of liability asserted, the doctrine applies to separate 
actions involving "essentially a single and continuing controversy o\er the appropriate 
relief to gi \ e for a sii iglc: \ \ i oi ig oi: close ly i elated gi on ip • : i \ i oi lgs." Chut c 7i \ h ieat low 
Springs Ranch Corp., Inc., 059 P.2d iu4^ ; iv/48 ii.l iUtah l y t t ^ (citation omitted), 
Specifieali; :h idafioh ;,• ilu requirement that subsequent claims should h.r.e 
been brougm in .* , .., , .uii,.., uiim preclusion "relleets the expectatioii that parties WHO 
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are given the capacity to present their 'entire controversies' shall in fact do so." 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(citation omitted). Claim preclusion bars "all issues which the party had a fair 
opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding." Jacobsen v. 
Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted). "If a party fails, purposely 
or negligently, to make good his cause of action by all proper means within his control, he 
will not afterward be permitted to deny the correctness of that determination, nor to 
relitigate the same matters between the same parties." Am. Estates Mgmt., 1999 UT App 
232, J^ 12 (citation, internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). In particular, a claim 
is one that "could" and "should" have been brought where it arose prior to the complaint 
in the first action, or where at the time of the first complaint the claimant was aware of 
the facts upon which he bases his later claim. Macris, 2000 UT 93, ^  9-13. 
In Am. Estate Mgmt., supra, AEM sued a prior owner/business partner in 1982 
claiming rights to a parking area based upon various written and oral agreements. Some 
15 years later, after an unsatisfactory result in the 1982 action, AEM sued over the same 
property, now alleging that it had acquired the parking area by adverse possession. This 
Court reviewed the trial court's dismissal of the second action based on a finding that the 
claim was barred by res judicata, relying on claim preclusion. Even though the cause of 
action in the first action was based on written agreements, and the second action was 
based on adverse possession, this Court concluded that because the adverse possession 
claim could and should have been asserted in the prior action, it was barred by claim 
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emu present actions assert one c la im-a claim of title to the parkin*.; lot parcel-albei t under 
two different legal theor ies ." 1999 I IT A p p 232, J^ ' " fhis court went m- \n ,\Mv ih.it: 
" I f a party fails, purposely or negligently,, to make good his cause of actioi i by i ill proper 
i i leai is vitl iii it 1 lis : : i iti c 1 1 i ,; ; < ill n : t be pern litt zd t : cl zi n ' the • :ot recti less of that 
determinat ion, nor to reli t igate the same i natters be tween the same par t ies ." Id. at |^ 12 
(quota t ions and citations omit ted) . 
Ii i • :)!'!( ie i vv c i ds. tl le detei i i iii latioi i • : f < '"1 lat is a "claii i i " is i IC i base d oi l tl ie • can ise of 
act ion chosen to advance the claini3 but on the operat ive facts and the situation that gives 
a parts a right to seek judicial interference In this ease, ihe J a i m is now and always has 
been Oil lmors asserm.. . ,*;,. .i,*.^ ,inve greater rigm . .- ..^ U .L .^ luaus 
same set »•! ' opera t ive facts. I he facts and evidence concerning the location .;iid luiiuie 
and i ise of the roads were integral to both the 1984 and 2001 act ions . There was no 
sigi lificai it cl mi lge ii l tl ie opei ath - e facts ft oi r - HI^L.-M 
reason in her 2007 complaii it why she could noi «n^ J iu not allege public use and 
dedicat ion or condemnat ion claims in the 2001 Action In fa J . in argument before the 
c la ims in the 2001 action w a s probably a mat ter oi slraici^ iK. 229, at 29, i .9 ; . m 
theory, those claii i is [condemnat ion ai id road-by-iisel could all have been raised fin he 
2001 actioi i ] . " Ai id the trial judge, w h o also tried the 2001 case, specilieali} stated \u nis 
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ruling that "Plaintiffs claims in this case could have been brought in Gillmor v. Macey et 
al., Civil No. 010600155, Third District Court 2001, or in Gillmor v. Richards, Civil No. 
8065, Third District Court, 1984." (Order, R. 154 at 155) 
Each of the causes of action asserted in 2001 and in 2007 seek the same relief, i.e., 
broader, unlimited use of the roads. The claims were perhaps best summarized by 
statements made by Gillmor's counsel to the trial court as follows: "The theory is Ms. 
Gillmor wants access. . ." (R. 110, p. 37, 1. 21-22.) Pleading the public use and 
condemnation claims for the first time in 2007 is precisely the type of piecemeal litigation 
of the same controversy that claim preclusion is meant to prevent. 
Gillmor argues in her brief (pp. 5-11) that res judicata cannot apply because the 
prior actions and the 2007 action do not involve the "same causes of action". In stating 
the premise, Gillmor acknowledges her argument is missing the mark. As discussed 
above, claim preclusion is not about "legal theories" or "causes of action", but about the 
claim being pursued, here claims of access over the Perdue Creek and Neil Creek roads. 
In making this argument, Gillmor relies on four cases: Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 
1337 (Utah 1983); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Hill v. Seattle First 
Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992); and Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P. 2d 689 (Utah 
1978). 
In Schaer, the Court recognized the broader rule that res judicata "...precludes the 
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, 
litigated in the prior action..." Schaer, 657 P. 2d at 1340 (citation omitted). Schaer 
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Mi\oj. KU a idiiiv uiiiiMitil sene> oi events i N o / , a part of the plaintiffs property was 
< * ».' 
trial court observed that Schaer was entitled to severance damages because the taking left 
him effectively landlocked. In 1979, the Stale w,^ » defenda; ; • .!.*. 
cot idet :t 11 latioi 1 actioi :t bi oi lgl it I: ;; - ai i adjoii lii lg proper t;y o w i iei \ v ho sougl it a determination 
case was settled without a ruling on the public thoroughfare clain m Schaer, which w as 
then •• . •••.• \ case. Schaer sought ° dc^crnnnanuu --,n ila dugway was n public 
this argument because of the finding in u ^ 1967 case that his propem was effectively 
landlocked. 
, ^:| • : .jccKvi :;ie argument ir.a: r ? 
judicata applied, l'he 1967 action was noi ; iN.r si M: • * • 
Schaer \s propert} being taken In the State. I he second action b\ Schaer did not in \u^ e 
condemnation, but was soleh CI.KHII the use of the dugway. 
I he presei it case is distingi lisl lable ft ;)i t l Si in n 7 becai ise • tl i ::: t < * ;r : • • :ai ises of actioi i 
raised in this case involve Gillmor's use of the roads, and could have been asserted in the 
lv>X4 aiul 2001 actions, where the claims were, again, Gil lmors use of the roads.. The 
• ipplu'iiliun A Si'httrr (li.il l i 1111 .tn.-m , lor (a) ti'tiuu , tin. |il„nii language ul lin U 
announced in Schaer (that res judicata precludes relitigation of issues that could have 
been litigated) and (K> would result in endless litigation between parties because there 
21 
would be no requirement that a complaining party bring all of their claims against an 
adversary in a single proceeding. In all three cases, the 1984 case, the 2001 case, and the 
2007 action, Gillmor sought the same result, i.e., broader, if not unbridled, use of the 
Perdue and Neil Creek roads over defendants' property. 
Gillmor next relies on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), an appeal 
from a tax court. In Sunnen, the Supreme Court concluded that where similar cases may 
involve different tax years, and different tax laws, the law of collateral estoppel must be 
carefully applied. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 599-600. The Supreme Court went on to 
conclude, based upon factors unique to tax courts, that the tax payer was not bound by a 
prior determination of tax liability based on prior years returns. The Supreme Court 
recognized that res judicata applies "'not only as to every matter which was offered and 
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter 
which might have been offered for that purpose/" Id. at 597 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). Thus, Sunnen is readily distinguishable by its unique facts, and 
supportive of defendants' position through the Court's recognition of the principle 
advanced by defendants in this action, i.e., that if Gillmor had claims related to her use of 
the roads that could have been asserted in 2001, she was obligated to raise them in 2001. 
The next case relied on by Gillmor, Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P. 2d 
241 (Utah 1992), also presents a unique fact situation. Hill had been involved in a federal 
court action against Citizens Bank of Ogden. Citizens had failed and been taken over by 
the FDIC. Seattle First was never served and did not participate in the federal action. 
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Because of tl le FDIC 's if IVOIV en lei it, certaii 1 claims were ban ed b;> federal la w I i ill, 82 7 
< ::n ii :l c i il:y pi iisi le claii i is based oi i w ritten agreements against 
(he 1-DIC and its claim that an oral agreement existed was precluded After the federal 
court made \\* I..-:I-L hi: ougl it tl le same dann> uuaiii^ Seattle Hrst (vur v ™ a 
judicata and collateral estoppel barred Hill fs claims against it. Hie trial court concluded 
that collateral estoppel barred Hill from pursuing its claims in the second action based on 
tl le alleged oral agreen tei it. 1 1 ic: 1 Ital l Supi ei i le Co ^agreed 1 1: K decisioi i does i lot 
address in any meaningful w a>< at i.y of tl ic issi les related to res iudicaU i tl iat e: :ist ii i tl lis 
case. 
. i:-«uU. appellants made no effort to discuss or appl\ V(///i Bros v. Stark. ^R8 
are successors in interest to earlier litigants. 
In short, none of the cases cited h\ Gilhu*-: undermine the fu! (IKII )I^ "CI.'1-M" 
assei ted in tl lis actioi i (Gilli i itoi 's i igl it tc \ ise tl ic :t oads) is 1:1 ic sai i le claii i i that si: le 1 las 
pursued in the two earlier actions, under different guises. 
3. The prior actions resulted in a judgment on the merits. 
1 1: ie 21301 ease was fullv an litigated oi i the merits, and .* "on-
appealable decisioi i was rendered Not c >nb - *\ as the case fi illy litigated di urii ig se"\ • ei al 
d a \ s i>! trial JSV' liter extensive writ ten findings and conclusions entered b> the trial 
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court, but the trial court's decision was largely affirmed on appeal. See Gillmor v. 
Macey, 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57, cert.denied, 126 P.3d 772 (UT 2005). 
The 2001 Complaint was a dispute over Gillmor's right to use the road based on 
the terms of the 1985 Agreement, which in turn was the settlement agreement for the 
1984 litigation that sought use of the same roads under theories of prescriptive use. The 
settlement in the 1984 litigation resulted in an express easement defining the location and 
scope of an easement in favor of Gillmor over the two roads on Defendants' properties. 
As such, the settlement reached in that case (as well as the Order of Dismissal (R. 31, Ex. 
3) also provides a basis for claim preclusion in this case. See Salt Lake City v. Silver 
Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995) (noting that courts have held that a 
stipulation between adverse parties can be considered a final judgment on the merits 
sufficient to invoke claim preclusion in a subsequent suit between the same parties). The 
Order dismissing Gillmor's claims in the 1984 action was with "prejudice on the merits." 
(R. 31, Ex. 3) The 2001 action was nothing more than another attempt by Gillmors to 
obtain broader access to the roads. Gilmore admits that the present action includes claims 
that could have been brought in at least the 2001 action (R. 229, p. 29, 1.9), again related 
to Gillmor's use of the roads. 
Claim preclusion bars Gillmor's claims in this matter. She is attempting to achieve 
the same objective of the prior two litigations "under a different guise." She is merely 
applying new and hitherto unplead causes of action to achieve access. All the elements 
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of claii i i preclusion are satisfied, ^ccuium^; eau, ciaim assent; ^ * ;.... . ;s 
actioi i is barred b] ' t e s judu : 'i iti i 
C. I liei e w as no intervening change in the law that precludes 
application of res judicata, 
Gillmor argues tl lat r e \s judicah i is ii lapplicable to tl lis case because b.erc :...ve 
to preserve her change in the law theory below and it should not be considered by tl lis 
Court. Furthermore, Gillmor does not assert that there was a change in condemnation law 
itie Court considers Gillmor s cliange in me law tlieoiy wiin respect to her claim ior a 
"declaration of highway b> use/' the theorx fail s on n •> P'; * *' f i •> 
i \\>.L i iillinor argues Ww^ \nc ' • . Appear dun^-i. \w i;,//.-.... • >n 
when it lessened the access she believed ihui she had pnor io L1IL, decision." ^App^ 
^ "
f
 P (emphasis added),) The Court of Appeals' correction of Gillmor's 
in the law. 
The chaii;.. ' Jl ) excepli*- : res judicata lias limited application. \s 
A LiitUi^c ni «i>L \,v\ /-.::_. j u r -. a pa: \ ... u. the effect of isauc 
preclusion. E.g., State Farm Mut. Autn, Ins Co v DiteL 324 U.S. 
154. !o2. U>5 S.O.. W) <57> !..I;d. 812 ( !<M: ) .;c\plaining that res 
judicata "is no defense where between the time of the first judgment 
and the second there has beer a(n intervening decision or a] ehar:.^ 
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in the law creating an altered situation"); Marino v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990) (concluding that 
"no judgment can affect subsequently arising rights and duties"). To 
invoke this exception, a party must establish that a new 
substantive right has been created. Besing v. Vanden Eykel, 878 
S.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Tex.App.1994) (ruling that a change regarding 
the applicable statute of limitations did not create a new substantive 
right). Whether a new substantive right has been created by a 
judicial opinion issued after the party's original suit has been 
decided, however, requires, at a minimum, an actual change in 
the law. 
Collins, 2002 UT 77, at f 14 (emphases added). 
Following these principles, the Court of Appeals did not change the law in its 2005 
decision against Gillmor, it merely ruled against her by, inter alia, rejecting her over-
reaching interpretation of the 1985 Agreement. See Gillmor, 2005 UT App 351 at 1fl[14, 
21-23, 25-26, 28-29, 31, 42-43. That the 2005 Gillmor Court disagreed with Gillmors 
"belief as to her access rights did not create any new substantive rights in Gillmor or any 
other party. Rather, the Court of Appeals merely clarified the parties' existing rights 
under the 1985 Agreement. Moreover, a judicial interpretation of a private contract 
simply does not and cannot change an actual law. 
Gillmor\s second argument is similarly misguided. Gillmor claims that the Utah 
Supreme Court changed the "highway-by-use law" in Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 
UT 10, 179 P.3d 768, "which allows her to bring her Complaint." (Appellant Br. at 12.) 
Contrary to Gillmor's argument, the Okelberry decision did not change the law, it 
clarified it. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, \ 15. See Tirozzi v. Shelby Ins. Co., 719 A.2d 62, 66 
(Conn. App. 1998) ("[Njeither this court nor our Supreme Court has recognized an 
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excepts i *n res judk xik i few siti lations where there is a cl lange ii 1 tl le law by 
< 1; = i i : S* "i • tit ' i ' Br vant 965 I > 2< 1 539 5 1 6 (I Jl • it 2 - j; |: - IS 5 8; "' ; ' " 
amendment whicl i, in effect, construes and clarifies a prior statute will be accepted as the 
legislative declauiwon o! thu migmai act"' and thus indicates "'a legislative purpose to 
In Okelberry, the Supreme Court sought to articulate a standardized definition for 
'V phrase fctconlinuousl\ used" as set forth by the legislature, but imi defined in T" ah 
.. ..,- ^Uication MaiWu . N. . iJkci;\rr\, _-. ."*• i 
I'U- .hi . ft %-\\-ti\\ :»• ihis a r e a .•! :; . b ^ -.ems la rgch lion; «... 
lac: -)\> we h a \ e nexer sel forth a standard lor determining what 
qualifies as a sufficient interruption to restail the running of the 
if* - e d ten- \ear period under the Dedication Statute. We do so 
now by setting forth a bright-line rule by which we intend to wAc 
application of the Dedication Statute more predict* Mi>; 
i 
P overt act that is intended by a properly owner to interiapt 
the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and P- reasonahh 
calculated P Ao so. constitutes an interruption sufficient P 
restart the runninp ; !'die requiied ten-year period under IK 
.. - J.H . HO! ihaii-* :.*- ;,,..,.*%.» w, uii j>cu< claiming 
dedication, for a highwa\ to be deemed dedicated to the pub-lie me 
part) claiming dedication nip.t establish b\ clear and cominemg 
evidence that the road at issue was continuously u ed as a public 
tho^'i^Mare for a period often vcar^ 
2 The Dedication Statute provides: "A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use oi 
the public when it has been continuous!} used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years." Utah Code Ann. § "?. ~ !0 J(! j (S 'NP & 2008* 
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Id. at f 15 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court did not change the Dedication 
Statute in Okelberry, it only clarified it to make it more predictable. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court cannot change the language of a statute by judicial decision without violating the 
constitutional mandate of separation of powers. See Utah Const. Art. V, f^ 1; accord 
Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah 1976) (stating "a constitutional or 
legislative change should come from the sovereign: the people" and observing "there is a 
definite distinction between a change in interpretation or application of a statute, which 
sometimes quite justifiably occurs, and attempting by judicial fiat to affect a substantial 
change in law as clearly expressed in a statute or the constitution."). 
Moreover, while the Supreme Court, on certiorari, rejected the Court of Appeals' 
interpretation of "continuously used" in the Dedication Statute,3 see Okelberry, 2008 UT 
10 at *p2, this does not constitute a change in the law. See Collins, 2002 UT 77 at *|15 
(observing there was no change in the law simply because the district court's 
interpretation of the law was rejected on appeal); Federated Dept Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 
452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) ('The res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed 
judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been 
wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case."). 
Finally, even if the Supreme Court did change the law by rejecting the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation of "continuously used," this would not preclude the application of 
res judicata to Gillmor's complaint. Gillmor has not demonstrated that her "highway by 
3 The Court of Appeals decision appears at Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App 
473, 153P.3d745. 
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use"' i I ii in 11 beeiiniK Uiihk mil, iililei Ilit: Supmik' * uinl ir |rUul ulii I ninil ul '"ippi'ak 
interpretation of the Dedication Statute. Indeed, Giilnior filed her Complaint in this 
action seeking a "declaration of highway b\ use" \v 'a*' of 2007—eight months after the 
* w.jii ui Appeals JUUO (Jkclhcrrv (Acci*\Mi* mul eiglh nu.i.ilu> o^ioi^ tfk Supreme Coi u t's 
2008 Okelberry decisioi :i Gilli it. ic it: 1:1 n is asserted si: le w as entitled to ji ldgi i: :iei: it i u idei 1:1: me 
Court of Appeals interpretation of the Dedication Statute. Any claimed change in the 
"highway by use" law is irrelevant. 
Ill ••! • o O R l S l i O t ^ i / AFFIRM THE '. IM AL v , o i K * DECISION ON 
IHE ALTERNATE GROUNDS THAI GILLMOR i s JUDICIALLY 
ESTOPPED FROM BRINGING HER PUBLIC USE CLAIMS. 
Ciillmor's claims for condemnat ion and highway by use are also barred b \ Inc 
Kir.^L iiiv v;; juuicui v.>u»ppc, because . • - u i i l m o r and her privies successfully main ta ined 
•!"; i ^ fin: authori t ) :~ _ „ : i t j u u & „„ alternate 
{ji'oitn.h at jud ic ia l estoppel . 
1
 U ik llii lnal until correct!) ;. .a..; iiua .. •. ...-w^w/n akme burred tn lhn-^s 
grounds of judicial, estoppel. 
It is well settled that an appellate court may ailum (lu iihignient 
appealed from "if ii is sustainable o\\ any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs 
from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or 
action, and this is true e\en though such ground or theor\ is not 
urged or argued on appeal In appellee, was not raised in the lower 
court, ami was not considered or passed on by the lower court." 
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Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58 flO, 52 P.3d 1158 (citation omitted). "The goal of the 
'affirm on any grounds' rule is judicial economy." Okelberry v. Daniels Land Ass'n, 2005 
UTApp3271[ll, 120P.3d34. 
The present case is appropriate for affirmance on the alternate grounds of judicial 
estoppel. As indicated below, all of the elements of judicial estoppel are met. Both 
parties briefed the issue below of whether Gillmor was judicially estopped from 
maintaining her claims for private condemnation and highway by use. (R. 48-53, 74-75) 
As such, Gillmor is not deprived of notice or an opportunity to address this issue. 
Although the trial court concluded that judicial estoppel did not bar Gillmor's claims (R. 
100 at 63), this Court is not bound by the trial court's conclusion because the grounds 
supporting judicial estoppel are "apparent on the record." Bailey, 2002 UT 58 at ^ |10. 
B. Gillmor's claims to make the roads at issue public are barred by 
judicial estoppel because she successfully maintained the position in 
prior lawsuits that the roads would remain private. 
The trial court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply because Gillmor "did 
not obtain relief in prior litigation based on any position which she is denying in this 
case." (R. 155, |^2.) Respectfully, Defendants submit that the trial court erred in making 
this conclusion. The parties to the 1984 Action settled that case by executing the mutually 
beneficial 1985 Agreement, which was specifically approved and adopted by the trial 
court. (R. 31, Ex. 3) In the 1985 Agreement, Gillmor's predecessor-in-interest and 
husband, Charles F. Gillmor, accepted and successfully maintained the position that the 
roads at issue would remain private. Gillmor herself has since affirmed these 
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i i'pj t" a/iil.iiion > (l\ !'I I \, I. "I "Mi iti it 1 lias iiSM'ilcd iiiid MICICSSIUII) IIMIIIIIIIIIMI iiglit i In 
use the roads under the 1985 Agreement ibr over two decades, based entirely on her 
status as a privy of Charles F. Gillmor. 
1 h icier judicial cstoppu, 'a person may not lo *hc prejudice oi another person. 
privies involving the same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully 
maintained,'" 3d Const & Dev., LLC* v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 I IT App 307 
"fast and loose" with the coim . . . . iu. ^citations omitted); see also, e.g.. ( orreia v. 
DeSimont 614 N V 2d -P* : '"16 (Mass. App. C\ 1°°~ • ( The priman concern of *u 
Lii^ iiiiiC i>i jiicir, i c^iupi'^, protect iu iiuegni) . ; ., * .^iiv,,,. process, *t>,it 
i t i vn lv i J|:
 t:'^S. 
attorneys, jiui judges, could _ ^ „„ Jeclaratioii^ of settlenicm ^ „_ 
court,;') (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
I II i : eleii lei its • :)f ji idicial estoppe I ai • i : (1) tl ic pi k : i and si lbseqi lei it litigatioi i 
iiivolve the same parties or their privies; (2; the prior and subsequent litigation invuivc 
the same subject matter; (3) the prior position was 'successfully maintained; and (4) the 
pai I:> seeking ji idle ial estoppel 1 las i c: lie d i ipoi i tl ic pi ioi testimony and "a L.^ .,. S^ 
position by reason oi a. Urvi* v. Johnson, 2008 U 1 2 (^11. 1' 7 7 I * 3d 600 ( : iti: iti : > i m, 
omitted). Each of these elements is met here. 
1. The prior proceedings and present proceeding invoK e the same parties 
or their privies, 
31 
A person in privity with another is one who is "so identified in interest with 
another that he represents the same legal right." Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d at 691. 
A privity relationship includes "a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property." 
Id. 
As indicated above in regards to claim preclusion (Section 11(B)(1)), there is no 
question that the same parties or their privities are involved in all of the proceedings. 
Defendants all own parcels formerly owned by Richards, who has been a defendant in all 
three actions. Because each defendant not a party to the 1984 or 2001 Actions has a 
"successive relationship to rights in property" with Richards, they are privies and this 
element of the analysis is satisfied. See id. (See also \ 2 at R. 36.) Ultimately, Gillmor 
did not dispute below that this prong of judicial estoppel was established. 
2. The original and subsequent actions involve the same subject matter. 
The 1984, 2001 and present actions each involve alleged rights to access the 
Gillmor property over the same two roads. All three actions deal with the extent of 
Gillmor's rights to use the roads over what was originally Richards' property. Gillmor is 
attempting to use a different legal theory, but the subject matter is the same. 
In the 1984 Action, Richards verbally challenged the right of people hunting on 
Charles F. Gillmor's property to use the two roads at issue—the Perdue Creek road and 
the Neil Creek road. (R. 31, Ex. 2, t 4.) See Gillmor, 2005 UT App 351 at 1(2. Charles F. 
Gillmor brought suit "to enjoin Richards' interference with his and his family's and 
friends' use of the roads and to claim a prescriptive easement over both trails." Id. 
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Charles F. Gillmor "claimed the Gillmor family had held a right of way over the dirt 
roads . . . ." Id The relief Nadine Gillmor sought in the 2001 Action was unfettered 
access across the Defendants' property via the two roadways—based on misguided 
interpretations of the 1985 Agreement. Id. at [^12. (Defs' Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J., 
Ex. 1, R. 31.) The relief Gillmor seeks in the present action is unlimited access across the 
Defendants' property, once again via the two roadways—this time as a member of the 
general public. 
It is clear that the same underlying subject matter is involved in all three actions: 
the Gillmor family's dogged attempts to gain access, over the same property, via the same 
roads. The only thing that has changed is the legal theory employed. 
3. Gillmor is seeking to deny the position, which she successfully 
maintained in prior litigation, that the access across Defendants' 
property is private and was intended to remain private. 
The Gillmors have successfully maintained for over 20 years that the roads are 
private. In executing the 1985 Agreement to settle the 1984 Action, Charles F. Gillmor 
took the position that the roads were and would remain private: 
Gillmor specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not use the 
Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his invitees, agents, 
or employees in such a manner so as to cause the Easements to 
become part of the public domain. Gillmor specifically covenants 
and agrees that he shall not allow the Gillmor Property to be used in 
such a manner so as to subject the Easements to demands by the 
public for access to any portion of the Gillmor property. 
(1985 Agreement, R. 31. at Ex. 3, f^ 2.) Charles F. Gillmor "successfully maintained" this 
position by using it to obtain a mutually beneficial settlement of the 1984 Action. Mr. 
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Gillmor's counsel in the 1984 Action testified in the 2001 Action that this warranty was 
critical to Richards' decision to execute the 1985 Agreement. (R. 114, Ex. 9 and R. 79, 
Transcript, p. 154, In. 10-15; p. 160, In. 9-11; p. 183, In. 2-8; p. 196, In. 5-14). The 1985 
Agreement was specifically approved and acted on by the court in the 1984 Action. The 
court entered the Order and Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice, "[b]ased upon the 
Stipulation of the parties herein made in open Court on November 21, 1985 and based 
upon the written stipulation filed herein," which was attached to the Order. (R. 31, Ex. 
3.) 
As recognized by this Court in Gillmor v. Macey, Charles F. Gillmor and his 
family, including Nadine Gillmor, reaped the benefits of 1985 Agreement with little 
disagreement "for over a decade" by using the roads as set forth in the Agreement. See 
2005 UT App 351 at ^ 3-4. Even after disputes arose, Nadine Gillmor brought and 
maintained the 2001 Action on rights purportedly stemming from the 1985 Agreement. 
Nadine Gillmor in fact made various representations in the 2001 Action that the relief she 
sought "would not harm the public interest, because only private property is involved, in 
which the public has no interest." (R. 31, Ex. 1, ^ 28.) She further testified that when 
Charles F. Gillmor created the easement with Richards "he didn't want [the road] to 
become public." (R. 5, R. 2014, March 4, 2002, p. 100:15-16; see Addendum.) 
The 1985 Agreement formed the basis for the parties' mutually beneficial 
settlement of the 1984 Action and was "accepted and acted upon by the Court." See 
Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 n.19 (Hawaii 1998) (indicating such action by the 
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court precludes a party from "subsequently repudiating a theory of action"). Once this 
occurred, Nadine Gillmor, as a privy of Charles F. Gillmor, became judicially estopped 
from maintaining the directly inconsistent position in the present litigation that the 
roadways are public or ought to be condemned for public use. See id; see also Correia, 
614 N.E.2d at 1016. That Gillmor ultimately did not prevail on all of her arguments in 
the 2001 Action does not preclude the application of judicial estoppel. Both prior to and 
following disposition of the 2001 Action, Gillmor used the roadways under rights flowing 
from the 1985 Agreement. After having enjoyed the benefits of the 1985 Agreement for 
so long of a period, she cannot now raise new claims that undermine the very warranties 
upon which that Agreement was based and upon which the 1984 Action was settled: that 
the roads would remain private. Judicial estoppel was designed to prevent such 
machinations by 'prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to 
the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001). 
4. Appellees relied on Charles F. Gillmor's warranty and Nadine 
Gillmor's affirmation that the roads would remain private. 
There was no claim in the 1984 Action that the Perdue Creek or Neil Creek roads 
were or had become public. Quite the opposite, to settle the 1984 Action, Charles F. 
Gillmor expressly warranted that the roads would not "become part of the public 
domain." (1985 Agreement, Ex. 3, <|[ 2 to R. 31.) Richards relied on this warranty as a 
condition to settling the 1984 Action, {see R. 52) Richards, therefore, relied on this 
representation and "changed his position by reason of it." Orvis, 2008 UT 2 at Tfll. 
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Moreover, because the 1985 Agreement was recorded against all of the properties 
involved, (Ex. 3 to R. 31), Richards' successors-in-interest, the Defendants here, relied on 
the warranty against public use of the roads in making their determinations to purchase 
their respective properties. Defendants suffered the Gillmor family's use for over 20 
years under rights stemming from the 1985 Agreement. Defendants further relied on 
Gillmor's affirmation in the 2001 Action that the roads would remain private. Had 
Gillmor made her assertions of public use in the 2001 Action, the defendants in that 
action would have sought damages and other remedies against Gillmor for breach of the 
1985 Agreement, including termination of any right to use the roads under that 
Agreement. 
Accordingly, for more than 20 years, Gillmor has benefitted from her husband's 
representations before the court in connection with the 1985 Agreement and her 
affirmation in the 2001 Action that the roads were and would remain strictly private. 
Defendants would be prejudiced, and the integrity of the judicial system subverted, if 
Gillmor is allowed to avoid the results of the 1984 and 2001 Actions now. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF RULE 11(b)(2) SANCTIONS AGAINST 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL WAS PROPER. 
The trial court awarded sanctions against Gillmor's counsel under Utah R. Civ. P. 
11(b)(2), which states that by presenting a pleading, an attorney is certifying that to the 
best of the attorney's knowledge, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances: 
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[T]he claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. 
The trial court awarded sanctions under this section based on its finding that the 
action was clearly barred by res judicata and therefore "not legally justified" by existing 
law. See Ruling, R. 195 at 204. The trial court further noted that given the state of the 
law, it was "at a loss to understand how plaintiff could have brought the present action 
without violating Rule 11(b)(2)." Id. at R. 202. The trial court's award of sanctions is 
supported by the record, and Gillmor's counsel fails to show that the imposition of 
sanctions in this case constitutes reversible error. 
The law is clear that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate when a plaintiff seeks to 
avoid the affect of a final decision on the merits of her claims by filing a new proceeding. 
See Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); accord 
Satterfield v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4180 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005) ("Courts 
have imposed sanctions where plaintiffs knew or should have known that their claims 
were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel"); Estate of Blue v. County of Los 
Angeles, 120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997) ("When a reasonable investigation would 
reveal that a claim is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel... Rule 11 sanctions may 
be imposed within the district court's discretion."); Williams v. Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2007) ("Rule 11 sanctions are 
appropriate where a party files a claim barred by res judicata"" (citing Thomas v. Evans, 
880 F.2d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 1989)). Sanctions are appropriate where the second 
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lawsuit brings new claims when the new claims could or should have been brought in the 
previous action. King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(upholding award of sanctions stating that "res judicata bars relitigation not only of those 
matters that were actually litigated, but also those which could have been litigated in the 
earlier proceeding.") 
In her brief, Gillmor argues that sanctions should not have been awarded because 
"all Rule 11 requires is good faith and that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry into the 
validity of the action, which Gillmor's attorney did."4 (Br. of Appellant, p. 13.) Gillmor 
cites to Barnard v. Sutliff 'in support of this contention. 
In Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 at 1236 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "the reasonableness of an attorney's view of the law is not a subjective 
standard...the attorney's view must be objectively reasonable when it is compared to 
existing law." In Barnard, the trial court ruled that an attorney violated Rule 11 by 
failing to properly research the court's jurisdiction before filing a suit seeking to enjoin a 
bar disciplinary proceeding against him where the Utah Constitution gives the Utah 
4 Gillmor appears to argue that a finding of bad faith is required before a violation can be 
found under Rule 11(b)(2). (Br. of Appellant, p. 16.) This argument directly contradicts 
Utah law: 
While bad faith may often be associated with violation of subparts (2) or (3) 
[of Rule 11(b)], such is not a necessary element. See Pennington v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932,939 n.3 (Utah 1998) (citing Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 n. 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). A lawyer may 
bring frivolous or inadequately supported claims merely by failing to 
exercise the minimal required level of professional care and judgment. 
Crank v. State Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8, \ 33; 20 P.3d 307 (emphasis added). 
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Supreme Court original jurisdiction over all such actions. In response to the motion for 
sanctions, the attorney submitted an affidavit which explained that he had been led to 
believe that the district court was the proper forum for his suit because he had previously 
successfully filed two similar suits which were decided on the merits by the district court. 
However, the attorney did not describe any steps he had undertaken to research the law 
underlying the jurisdictional question. The district court granted the motion for sanctions. 
Thereafter, the attorney filed an objection challenging the court's findings on the merits 
of the Rule 11 motion. In support of his objection, the attorney filed a second affidavit in 
which he outlined in detail the steps he took in conducting his legal research. The district 
court denied the attorney's objection. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the award of sanctions on two 
grounds. First, the Court found that "[although the rule 11 duty to investigate the law is 
premised on the need for actual research, the personal knowledge of how coordinate 
courts have resolved similar issues is relevant in deciding whether an attorney made a 
reasonable inquiry into the law." Id. at 1236. Second, the Court noted that the law was 
not reasonably clear that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over the type of 
action brought by the attorney.5 
The present case is distinguishable from Barnard, because in this case Gillmor's 
counsel failed to offer any explanation to the trial court of what steps he had taken to 
5 Similarly, in affirming the denial of Rule 11 sanctions in Hess v. Johnson, 2007 UT 
App 213, ^  12, 163 P.3d 747, the Utah Supreme Court found that earlier case law did not 
clearly foreclose plaintiffs claims, and sanctions were therefore unwarranted. 
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inquire into the validity of this action other than to state baldly that he "researched the law 
and determined that Gillmor did have a new basis to file a Complaint following the Court 
of Appeals decision." See Plaintiffs Memo, in Opp. to Defendants5 Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions, p. 5 (R. 162). The application of Barnard for which Gillmor's counsel argues 
ignores the clear instructions of the Utah Supreme Court that the focus of the "reasonable 
inquiry" analysis "should be on what the attorney actually did in researching the law" and 
would never result in the imposition of sanctions against counsel since all an attorney 
would have to do to avoid sanctions is affirmatively state that he "researched the law". 
Id 
Given the absence of any explanation as to the research undertaken, the trial court 
properly focused its analysis on whether "there [was] an objectively reasonable basis in 
law justifying [Gillmor s counsel's] new approach to Ms. Gillmor's apparently intractable 
problem of how to obtain access to her property." (Br. of Appellant, p. 7.) It properly 
concluded there was not. 
In opposition to defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the trial court, Gillmor offered 
the following justifications. First, Gillmor argued to the trial court that her claims in this 
action were not barred because except for the "theoretical possibility of them, [the claims] 
did not practically exist until the Court of Appeals decision". (R. 160) However, at the 
December 19, 2007 hearing, Gillmor's counsel argued that the road-by-use claim was 
based on public use which occurred before the 1984 (first) lawsuit, and acknowledged it 
could have been asserted in the 1984 Action. (R. 110 at 25-27.) 
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Gillmor also argued that her claims in this action were unnecessary until the Court 
of Appeals decision in the 2001 Action, and therefore res judicata should not apply. (R. 
160) It may well be that Gillmor was so sure that her interpretation of the Easement 
Agreement would prevail in the 2001 Action that she did not think she needed to plead 
any alternative claims. However, Gillmor failed to provide any support for her argument 
that being wrong about the strength of her claims avoids the application of res judiciata to 
other claims that were omitted as a matter of strategy or otherwise in the prior action. 
Finally, Gillmor never provided the trial court with any legal authority that 
supported her assertion that "equitable" factors might justify the non-application of res 
judicata in any case, let alone this case. The two cases that Gillmor relied upon (p. 2,3 of 
Gillmor's October 10, 2007 Memo, R. 71, 72.) consisted of statements from dissenting or 
non-majority opinions. Further, Gillmor failed to provide the trial court with any policy 
reasons that might warrant the extension of any of the dissenting opinions she cited into 
the arena of real property law, an area where finality is especially important. 
The trial court rejected Gillmor's arguments and concluded that this suit was 
clearly barred by the res judicata effect of the 2001 judgment. (Rule 11 Order, p. 8) (R. 
202.) Specifically, the Court noted that it was "unaware of any exceptions to application 
of the bar imposed by res judicata, and plaintiff ha[d] not identified any such exception." 
(Id.) These findings are supported by the record, and fully support the award of Rule 
11(b)(2) sanctions. 
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Gillmor's new arguments concerning res judicata before this Court are equally 
unavailing. As demonstrated in Section II above, none of the cases she cites provide a 
basis for denying application of res judicata, and there has been no change in the law. 
This Court should therefore affirm the award of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2), and 
impose additional sanctions in this appeal under Rule 33(b), U.R.App.P. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court Err in Refusing to Grant Sanctions Under Rule 
11(b)(1)? 
a) Standard of Review: "When reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 determination, 
we review the trial court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, the trial 
court's conclusion that Rule 11 was violated under a correction of error standard, and the 
trial court's determination of the type and amount of sanction to be imposed under an 
abuse of discretion standard." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) citing Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992) 
b) Issue Preserved for Appeal: Defendants preserved this claim of error at R. 126-
127. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
The trial court did err in concluding that Gillmor did not violate Rule 11(b)(1) by 
filing this action. Gillmor's purpose was to avoid the decisions of the courts which have 
previously heard claims for greater access to her property over the Perdue Creek and Neil 
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Creek roads and denied those claims. Such a purpose is improper for Rule 11 analysis as 
a matter of law. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RULEll(b)(l) SANCTIONS. 
A. The trial court erred in characterizing Gillmor's purpose. 
Defendants sought sanctions in the trial court against Gillmor and her attorney 
under Rule 11(b)(1) which states that by presenting a pleading an attorney is certifying 
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances that: 
it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
One such improper purpose identified by this Court is the avoidance of the res 
judicata effect of prior decisions. In Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584 
(Utah App. 1990) {Schoney I), plaintiff brought a variety of claims against defendants, all 
of which were disposed of by a default judgment. The trial court's grant of a default 
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the Utah Supreme Court denied 
review. A year after the Court of Appeals decision and four months after the Supreme 
Court denied review, plaintiff moved for appointment of a class representative in the trial 
court to pursue the case, an action that was "no different from filing a new complaint 
containing the original claims." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (UT App 
1993) (Schoney II) at 60, n.l. In Schoney II, the trial court denied the motion and 
awarded defendant costs and fees as Rule 11 sanctions. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
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the award of sanctions on the grounds that plaintiffs effort to avoid the res judicata effect 
of the prior decisions was "unconscionable and without reason." It held, "no proper 
purpose can be justified by ignoring the rulings of foregoing tribunals." Id. at 62. 
In this case, the trial court denied the request for sanctions against Gillmor under 
Rule 11(b)(1) on the ground that Gillmor's purpose was not improper. (R. 198-200) The 
trial court erred in characterizing Gillmor's purpose and denying Rule 11 sanctions on 
that basis. 
In denying sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1), the trial court held "[Gillmor's] purpose 
is clear - to obtain access that has not been obtained through previously advanced 
theories." (R. 200) By characterizing Gillmor's purpose in this way, the trial court 
ignored the teaching of Schoney and the burdens and expense imposed on defendants 
when a party brings a series of lawsuits making different claims each time but all with the 
same underlying goal. On the trial court's reasoning, no matter how many lawsuits 
Gillmor brings, none will have an improper purpose because in every case her "purpose" 
will be to obtain access to her property. 
After the first, or surely second, lawsuit with the same goal, the purpose of the next 
lawsuit is correctly characterized as avoiding the effect of the prior decisions. Such a 
purpose is improper and should be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)(1). 
B. The test for improper purpose is objective. 
In determining that Gillmor did not file this action for an improper purpose, the 
trial court also considered whether Gillmor acted with subjective bad faith as defined 
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under U.C.A. §78-27-56. (R. 199) However, the test under Rule 11(b)(1) of whether a 
purpose is improper is an objective inquiry and does not require a finding of subjective 
bad faith. The Utah Supreme Court has specifically distinguished Rule 11 sanctions in 
cases where actions are brought for an improper purpose from those awarded under 
U.C.A. §78-27-56 saying, "In contrast [to sanctions under §78-27-56], Rule 11 sanctions 
do not require a party to act with a lack of good faith." Pennington v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., 973 P. 2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998). 
C. Gillmor and her counsel were aware that res judicata barred this 
action. 
Gillmor's counsel acknowledged during the December 19, 2007 hearing on 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss that he and Gillmor knew that the doctrine of res judicata 
was going to present an obstacle to Gillmor"s claims in this action. As Gillmor's counsel 
acknowledged, he had anticipated the res judicata issue, and it was laid out clearly by 
counsel for defendants in the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions sent to 
counsel before the motion to dismiss was filed. (R. 110 at p. 23, 1. 25.) Counsel also 
admitted advising Gillmor that the Defendants' had "a pretty good argument in this case 
[on claim preclusion]." (R. 110 at p. 31,1. 2.) 
Counsel for Gillmor further acknowledged that the claims brought in this action 
could have been brought in the 2001 Action, but it would have been "dicey" to do so 
because at that time Gillmor was arguing that she had extensive private rights to use the 
roads under the Easement Agreement. (R. 110 at p. 40) Failing to plead an available 
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claim because it might weaken other, stronger claims, litigating the stronger claims 
through all available appeals and then a year and a half later bringing the weaker claims 
in another suit is exactly the kind of behavior that res judicata was aimed at preventing. 
D. Gillmor and her counsel remain undeterred by successive rulings 
against Gillmor. 
In the course of the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, counsel for 
Gillmor made clear that Gillmor would not accept the Court's ruling as a final end to her 
efforts to gain greater access to her property across the Perdue Creek and Neil Creek 
roads. Counsel stated that no judicial economy would be achieved by a dismissal of this 
action on the basis of res judicata because if the action were dismissed, he would "bring 
[the road by use claim] in somebody else's name." At one point in the argument, 
Gillmor's counsel stated that he would "find somebody off the street" to bring the road by 
use claim. (R. 110 at 33.) 
In fact, counsel for Gillmor has done exactly what he threatened to do. In 
December 2007, he brought the road by use claim against the Defendants in the name of 
Gillmor's daughter, Sheila Williams. Williams v. Family Link, LLC et aL, Civil No. 
080500855, Third Judicial District Court. It is thus clear that the sanctions imposed by 
the trial court solely against Gillmor's counsel have had no deterrent effect at all. 
Sanctions should also have been awarded against Nadine Gillmor and her counsel under 
the objective standards of Rule 11(b)(1). 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's determination that Gillmor's claims are barred by res judicata and 
ts award of sanctions against Gillmor's counsel under Rule 11(b)(2) should be affirmed, 
sanctions should also be awarded as a result of this appeal by Gillmor. The trial court's 
Ienial of sanctions against Gillmor and her counsel under Rule 11(b)(1) should be 
eversed. The case should be remanded for a detemiination and award of sanctions under 
lule 11(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P. and Rule 33(b), U.R.App.P. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2009. 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorney for Family Link, LLC 
Kenneth W. Macey and Robin A. Macey 
Elizabeth T. Dunning Q Cjl (]\&J) 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP 
299 South Main, Suite. 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
&UA1. C • fey ^ ^L 
Edvvin C. Barnes b^, K: 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's determination that Gillmor's claims are barred by res judicata and 
its award of sanctions against Gillmor's counsel under Rule 11(b)(2) should be affirmed. 
Sanctions should also be awarded as a result of this appeal by Gillmor. The trial court's 
denial of sanctions against Gillmor and her counsel under Rule 11(b)(1) should be 
reversed. The case should be remanded for a determination and award of sanctions under 
Rule 11(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P. and Rule 33(b), U.R.App.P. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2009. 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorney for Family Link, LLC 
Kenneth W. Macey and Robin A. Macey 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP 
299 South Main, Suite. 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Edwin C. Barnes 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
1. The attached page (100) of the trial transcript was referred to and quoted 
from in the record in the trial court at R. 51, but was inadvertently not attached to the 
pleadings in the trial court. 
2. Rulell,U.R.Civ.P. 
PAGE 1 SHEET 1 
Bl THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NADINE GILLMOR, 
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vs. 
) 
) CIVIL NO. 010600155 
) 
) BENCH TRIAL 
J 
) March 4, 2002 
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1 brief, your Honor, cited nany cases. I haven't found 
2 a Utah case specifically on this issue of 
3 negotiations leading to an instrunent, but the cases 
4 I have cited are all on 803, sub 3, or analogous 
5 rules on the adnissibility of this type of evidence 
6 in that regard. 
7 What I think is that there are statenents 
8 that are nade and there are obviously concessions 
9 that are nade off of those statenents, and it's the 
10 evolutionary process that's involved that I think 
11 will provide the court with the neaning that's 
12 attached to the ultinate docunent. 
13 THE COURT: Response? 
14 MS. DUNNING: Yeah. Judge, it's, I think. 
15 the very difference that you raised a ninute ago. 
16 This is being offered, this testinony ~ Frank said, 
17 "I'll never give up any of ny rights" — to 
IB contradict the terns of the agreenent. That's 
19 different than testinony about his understanding of 
20 what the agreenent said. We know what the positions 
21 of the parties were, going into litigation and right 
22 before trial. We've got the conplaints and we've got 
23 the trial order, so that — 
24 THE COURT: And that goes to your 
25 illustrations and the statenent which every one of us 
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1 has dealt with, I never will, I never will, and write 
2 the check, and so I'n not sure about its relevance, 
3 even if it's adnissible. I want to give you sone 
4 latitude here. I want to hear what happened, how 
5 they got to the point of the understanding, such as 
6 It was, but I'n not going to accept the statenent, 
7 for exanple, just as I will never, unless he said 
B that "and write that in the danned agreenent," for 
9 exanple. I nean, it has to go to the agreenent. So 
10 I'n sustaining the objection on that single question, 
11 but I'll give you sone latitude here. 
12 Q (BY MR. SCOFIELDJ Before Mr. Gillnor 
13 signed Exhibit 1, did he express to you what his 
14 understanding was of what he would or would not be 
15 giving up? 
16 A Ue discussed it. 
17 Q And was that at the courthouse? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q During the course of these negotiations 
20 you've described? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And was that — and I'n talking 
23 specifically about the final draft of this agreenent 
24 right before he signed it, not any prior iterations 
25 in the discussions. Who was present at the tine Mr. 
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1 Gillnor expressed his understanding of what this 
2 agreenent was he was about to sign and what rights he 
3 would or would not be giving up? 
4 A The way this cane about — 
5 Q Right now I'n just asking who was present 
6 when he nade those statenents. 
7 A Oh. There was Steve Gillnor, Janes 
8 Elegante, Frank Gillnor and nyself. 
9 Q Okay. Was Derek Langton present as well? 
10 A Yes. Yes. 
11 Q And what did Mr. Gillnor express concerning 
12 his understanding of the agreenent he was about to 
13 sign? 
14 A He turned to Mr. Elegante and he said, "If 
15 I give up ny rights to Neil Creek." and at that point 
16 Steve says, "No, we can't give then up because 
17 there's too nany landslides. We've got to have a 
IB provision in there of, in case of an energency, we 
19 can get aninals and ourself out." 
20 Q Okay. But that was before this final — 
21 A This was the final — to get there. 
22 Q Yeah, but I'n talking about the final 
23 version. Let's focus on the — because this one has 
24 the provision for energency access to the highway. 
25 A That's right. 
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1 Q So I just want to know, before he signed 
2 this, if he expressed his understanding of what this 
3 docunent was. 
4 A Yes. He said then, "I'n not giving UP any 
5 of ny rights in Perdue Creek." 
6 THE COURT: In Perdue Creek? 
7 THE WITNESS: In Perdue Creek. 
8 Q (BY MR. SCOFIELD) Did Mr. Gillnor, at that 
9 sane point in tine, express any understanding about 
10 the issue in this docunent concerning not allowing 
11 the easenent to be used so that it would becone part 
12 of the public donain? 
13 A Absolutely. 
14 Q And what did he express in that regard? 
15 A He said he didn't want it to becone public, 
16 either. 
17 Q Before Mr. Gillnor signed this Exhibit 1, 
IB did he nake any expressions about his understanding 
19 of whether this agreenent had anything to do with his 
20 historical rights on Perdue Creek Road? 
21 A He nade it very — he asked Mr. Elegante 
22 tine and tine again if this was giving UP anything of 
23 his rights to what he had done in the past and his 
24 ability to get in and out, and at that point, other 
25 than the hunters that was concerned, that was the 
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RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND 
OTHER PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT; SANC-
TIONS 
(a) Signature. 
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at 
least one attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented by the party. 
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by 
law as binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied 
by affidavit or have a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule 
requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the 
person may submit a declaration pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-5-101. If 
a statute requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signa-
ture and the party electronically files the paper, the signature shall be notarized 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-1-16. 
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is 
corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), 
an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under 
the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject 
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the 
attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are 
responsible for the violation. 
(c)(1) How initiated. 
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific 
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in 
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may 
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or 
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court 
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and 
attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate 
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circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations com-
mitted by its partners, members, and employees. 
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an 
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and 
directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated 
subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of 
this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct 
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations 
in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives 
of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on 
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to 
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses 
incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party 
for a violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative 
unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or 
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose 
attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the 
sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do 
not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and 
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
[Amended effective September 4, 1985; April 1, 1997; April 1, 2008J 
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